The Huthis: Adaptable Players in Yemen's Multiple Geographies by Eleonora Ardemagni

Author:Eleonora Ardemagni [Ardemagni, Eleonora]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Political Freedom, Social Science, Indigenous Studies
ISBN: 9788893354653
Google: L4z5xwEACAAJ
Amazon: B07V82XNT8
Goodreads: 49902699
Publisher: EDUCatt
Published: 2019-01-15T03:17:48+00:00

Transnational Legitimacy and Warfare:

The Implications of Strengthened Huthi-Iran Relations

It would be simplistic and short-sighted to frame the 2015 Yemeni civil war as a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or as a sectarian dispute between different confessional affiliations. Certainly, Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the Sunni-Shia divide have become relevant layers of the war, but this was a consequence, not the origin, of the conflict, which is strictly domestic and political. As in a self-fulfilling prophecy, the relationship between Iran and the Huthis has grown closer since the Saudi-led military intervention of 2015, with the Yemeni Zaydi Shia movement in need of support to counter the Saudi offensive and, on the other hand, with Tehran’s opportunity to pressure the Saudi kingdom, at very low cost, on its southern border.

From a regional perspective, the so-called Middle Eastern Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran has altered the conflict, triggering sectarianism64. Iran doesn’t seem able to affect Huthi decision-making, although Husayn Al-Huthi used to cite Iran, Khomeini and Hezbollah during his lectures, calling the United States the “Great Satan”: Zaydi Shia revivalists have a Yemeni, northern-focused agenda, not a regional, Iranian-proxy style one. Nevertheless, the Saada leadership increasingly leans on Iran’s political and media support to gain domestic legitimacy vis-à-vis what they perceive as Saudi military aggression, which provoked a clear “rally around the flag” effect. This strategy has also helped the Huthis to acquire not only visibility at a regional level, but also some sort of transnational legitimacy, coalescing a sentiment of solidarity among Shia groups in the region.

The Iranian military support for the Huthis was also confirmed by the United Nations. In 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance” with previous resolutions of the Security Council, since “it failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer” of ballistic missiles and drones, which entered in pieces despite the arms embargo on Yemen and were then re-assembled on the territory with the technical support of Hezbollah and Iranian trainers65.

From 2015 onwards, the Huthis strengthened relations with Iran and its Shia allies: if we look at this dynamic, the Saudi and Emirati-led military intervention in Yemen was even counterproductive, since it helped to regain some territories (Aden, parts of the Red Sea coast), but pushed the Huthis further into the Tehran-led transnational Shia network, although the Huthis remain the most external and least dependent element so far66. In 2016 the Huthis sent official delegations to Lebanon (August 2016), Iraq (September 2016) and Iran, multiplying visits at top political and religious Shia venues67. Hezbollah provides medical care for wounded Huthi fighters in Lebanon. The TV station of the Huthis, al-Masira, is allowed to broadcast from the southern district of Beirut (Dahiye), the stronghold of Hezbollah; the insurgent movement receives extensive coverage by Iranian and Lebanese media channels. As a result, the Huthis are not only perceived and recognized in the Middle East as Yemeni actors, but also as Shia actors and this phenomenon might assume a self-perception connotation.

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